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Statement of Issues and Standards of Review 
This case involves Susan Olsen's efforts to avoid paying a $678 debt to the 
University of Phoenix for (i) unpaid course tuition, (ii) the costs of course materials, and 
(iii) a late fee. In Ms. Olsen's deposition, she admitted to having taken classes for which 
she did not pay. In addition, the University provided undisputed evidence that Ms. Olsen 
accessed course materials for which she admits she did not pay. Nonetheless, in 
opposing the University's motion for summary judgment, Ms. Olsen asserted that she 
should not be required to pay the debt and that the University should not have attempted 
to collect the debt or ultimately have reported her delinquent account to the credit 
bureaus. The district court rejected her assertions as lacking any evidentiary support and 
entered summary judgment in favor of the University. 
Issue: Whether the district court correctly concluded that (i) Ms. Olsen failed to 
pay for all of her classes and electronic reading materials she accessed and used and 
(ii) the University properly attempted to collect the monies Ms. Olsen admits she owes. 
Standard of Review: The district court's decision to grant summary judgment is 
reviewed for correctness. Harvey v. Cedar Hills City, 2010 UT 12, f 10, 127 P.3d 256. 
Determinative Provisions 
Determinative provisions are attached at Addendum B. 
i 
Statement of the Case 
I. Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition Below 
In January of 2004, Ms. Olsen enrolled as an online student at the University of 
Phoenix, taking various graduate level courses online to satisfy the requirements for a 
Utah elementary teaching certificate. Ms. Olsen later transferred from the "online" 
campus to the Utah ground campus ("Utah Campus") to take a graduate level directed 
study course. At the time of her transfer, Ms. Olsen had not paid for two of her online 
courses. In the subsequent months, the University attempted to collect both unpaid 
tuition and a fee for electronic reading materials that Ms. Olsen used, which totaled $678, 
including a late fee. Eventually, the University sent the account to collections. 
On May 31, 2006, Ms. Olsen brought this lawsuit, asserting claims for breach of 
contract, violation of the Federal Fair Credit Reporting Act, violation of the Utah 
Consumer Sales Practices Act, and for misrepresentation and infliction of emotional 
distress. (R. 1-16.) On April 30, 2008, the University moved for summary judgment on 
the grounds that (i) Ms. Olsen admitted she had not paid the for all of her courses, (ii) the 
University properly charged Olsen for online reading materials she accessed and used, 
and (iii) the University thus had done nothing wrong in its collection efforts. (R. 62-179.) 
On May 12, 2009, the district court granted the motion, ruling that Ms. Olsen 
provided no evidence to dispute that (i) she owed the University $588 in unpaid tuition 
and a $30 late fee; (ii) she owed the $60 fee for electronic resources, or e-Resources, for 
the online textbook she accessed for class; or (iii) the University appropriately attempted 
to collect the $678. (R. 430-32.) 
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II. Statement of Facts 
The University of Phoenix is the largest private university in North America, 
specializing in making higher education accessible for working students. (R. 83.) 
Ms. Olsen was a student at the University in 2004, taking various classes to fulfill the 
requirements for an elementary teaching certificate. (R. 97.) The University offers 
online classes, as well as classes at numerous campuses throughout the country, including 
its Utah Campus located on 5300 South adjacent to 1-15. (R. 84.) 
As with most college courses, courses at the University, both online and in-person, 
require students to purchase textbooks or other reading materials. (R. 84-85, 324.) 
Occasionally, reading materials are available online, for which the University charges a 
$60 "E-Resource" or electronic resource fee—as explained in the student catalog and the 
online course description on the course website for each class—in lieu of the student 
having to purchase a separate textbook, often a substantial savings. (R. 84-85, 324.) 
A. Ms. Olsen Enrolls at University of Phoenix and Pays for Classes 
Ms. Olsen was not enrolled in any specific program, but attended the University to 
take a few specific classes related to teaching science, math, social studies, and reading 
for an elementary teaching certificate. (R. 97.) Ms. Olsen originally enrolled as an 
"online" student, meaning she was registered with the online campus and took her classes 
online. (R. 98-99.) Ms. Olsen paid for her online classes with her credit card, either by 
phoning in payment or through a pre-authorized automatic charge to her credit card, 
which she provided the online campus when she first enrolled. (R. 100-104.) In the late 
winter/early spring of 2004, Ms. Olsen paid for and enrolled in the following online 
classes: MED 500, RDG 513, MED 506, and MED 503. (R. 113-14.) 
B. Ms. Olsen Fails to Pay for the Two Online Classes 
Later, in the spring and summer of 2004, Ms. Olsen registered for two other online 
courses, SPE 532 and MED 509. (R. 84, 113-14, 140.) She also elected to take MAT 
534, a directed study course offered only through the Utah Campus and for which she 
transferred from the online campus to the Utah Campus. (R. 84, 113-14, 140.) SPE 532 
and MED 509 charged at $498 fee per course, for a total of $996, and MAT 534 charged 
at $588, plus a directed study fee of $250. (R. 84, 105-06, 324.) Unlike previous online 
courses that required textbooks, the readings for the Utah Campus MAT 534 class were 
offered in electronic form, for which the University charged a $60 e-Resource fee upon 
access of the online reading materials, as explained on the class website where the 
reading materials are accessed. (R. 84, 105-06, 324.) 
The University did not initially charge Ms. Olsen's credit card for the online 
courses SPE 532 and MED 509. (R. 84, 115-21, 142, 144-57.) On June 2, 2004, 
Ms. Olsen made a payment of $838 for the Utah Campus course MAT 534 ($588 for 
tuition, and $250 for the directed study fee); on June 10, 2004, she made an additional 
payment of $408 for at least a portion of the two online courses, for a total of $1246. (R. 
115-21, 142, 144-57.) However, because she had not paid for SPE 532 and MED 509, 
her June payments were applied first to those prior classes, then to the directed study fee 
for MAT 534 (later changed to MAT 536), as follows: 
SPE 532 $498 
MED 509 $498 
MAT 534/536 Directed Study $250 
TOTAL: $1246 
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This left a balance owing on her account in the amount of the previously unpaid tuition. 
(R. 84-85,111-13,137-38.) 
C. When the University Cancels MAT 534, Ms. Olsen Enrolls in a More 
Expensive Course, but the University Agrees to Charge the Same Price 
The University cancelled MAT 534 before Ms. Olsen could take the class; 
thereafter, in consultation with her academic advisor, Ms. Olsen decided to take MAT 
536, another directed study course offered through the Utah Campus. (R. 107-08.) 
Tuition for MAT 536 was $102 more than the tuition for MAT 534. (R. 140.) 
In her complaint, Ms. Olsen alleged that she and the University "entered into an 
agreement whereby the University agreed to accept as payment in full for the course title 
MAT 536 the amount previously paid for the cancelled course MAT 534." (R. 6.) In her 
deposition she explained that her academic advisor had agreed that the tuition for MAT 
536 would be the same as for MAT 534 because of the class cancellation. (R. 107-08, 
111-13, 137-38, 84-85.) Ms. Olsen also met with education chair Jill Muir, who agreed 
that Ms. Olsen would not be charged for having to change to MAT 536 from MAT 534. 
(R. 109-10.) No University representative had any discussion with Ms. Olsen about 
textbooks, required reading materials, or an electronic reading materials e-Resource fee. 
(R. 109-10.) 
Several weeks later, after the University invoiced Ms. Olsen for the original higher 
tuition rate for MAT 536, Ms. Olsen questioned the amounts and informed the University 
that (i) her academic advisor had agreed she would pay the lower tuition rate; and (ii) she 
believed she had already paid for the class. (R. 107-08, 124, 135, 163, 170, 179.) The 
University agreed to charge the reduced price and thereafter deducted $102 from the 
amounts owing on her account (the difference between what she was quoted and the 
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amount normally charged for MAT 536). (Id.) Additionally, to clarify which classes had 
not been paid for, the University adjusted Ms. Olsen's account to show payment for MAT 
536 and a balance due for the prior classes—SPE 532 and MED 509—of $588 plus the 
$60 electronic textbook e-Resource fee for MAT 536. (R. 170, 179.) 
D. Olsen was Charged $60 for Accessing and Downloading the Electronic 
Reading Materials Associated with MAT 536 
As explained in the student catalog and on the individual webpage for each 
particular class, the required textbook for both the cancelled MAT 534 and MAT 536 that 
Ms. Olsen took was electronic rather than hardback. (R. 84, 88-90, 324.) In addition to 
the explanation on the course websites, prior to clicking on a link to access the reading 
materials, a student is informed of the accompanying $60 e-Resource fee for accessing 
and using the electronic course reading materials. (R. 84, 88-90, 324.) Accordingly, 
when Ms. Olsen logged onto the University website she was informed of the e-Resource 
charge and agreed to the accompanying $60 fee when she clicked on the link and 
accessed the reading materials. (R. 84, 88-90, 324.) 
E. Ms. Olsen Fails to Pay the Balance Due and Admits She Owes It 
Ms. Olsen did not pay her account but continued to dispute it, and, because the 
account remained unpaid, in September 2004 the University added a $30 late fee per 
published school policy, as reflected on the October 2004 statement. (R. 89-90, 166, 
171-72, 175.) The University eventually transferred the account to collections. (R. 89-
90, 166, 171-72, 175.) The University nonetheless sent a letter outlining all the classes 
and payments, showing a balance of $678, and explaining that while the payments on her 
account summary were allocated differently (to different courses) than in the letter, the 
balance due remained the same. (R. 122-23, 159-61.) The University also offered to 
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waive the $30 late fee and the $60 e-Resource fee if Ms. Olsen paid the remaining 
amounts, something Ms. Olsen did not do. (R. 122-23, 159-61.) 
As explained in the letter, regardless of how Ms. Olsen's payments were applied, 
the fact remains that Ms. Olsen did not pay for all of her classes. (R. 122-23, 159-61.) 
The following amounts were charged to Ms. Olsen's account at the University: 
19-Feb-04 MED/500 $498.00 
4-Mar-04 RDG/513 $498.00 
ll-Mar-04 MED/506 $498.00 
22-Apr-04 MED/503 $498.00 
3-Jun-04 D:MAT/534 $250.00 
17-Jun-04 SPE/532 $498.00 
24-Jun-04 MED/509 $498.00 
30-Jun-04 D.-MAT/536 $250.00 
ll-Jul-04 MAT/536 $690.00 
ll-Jul-04 R:MAT/536 $ 60.00 
5-Aug-04 Transcript Fee $ 5.00 
10-Sep-04 Late Fee $ 30.00 
16-Feb-06 Transcript Fee $ 7.00 
Total Charges: $4280.00 
Ms. Olsen made only the following payments to the University, and the University made 
the following adjustments to Ms. Olsen's account (not including writeoffs): 
($498.00) 
($996.00) 
($498.00) 
($838.00) 
($408.00) 
($5.00) 
($7.00) 
($3,250.00) 
: charge ($250.00) 
of directed study fee due 
to MAT 534/536 switch 
l-Aug-04 MAT 536 tuition adjustment ($102.00) 
Total University Adjustments ($352.00) 
Total Payments & Adjustments ($3,602.00) 
20-Feb-04 
27-Feb-04 
13-Apr-04 
2-Jun-04 
10-Jun-04 
5-Aug-04 
16-Feb-06 
Total Payments 
16-MAR-04 
MED/500 
RDG/513 
MED503 
Transcript Fee 
Transcript Fee 
credit for dou 
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This left a balance of: 
Total Charges $4,280.00 
Less Total Payments & Adjustments ($3,602.00) 
BALANCE $ 678.00 
(R. 115-23, 142, 144-57, 159-61.) 
In Ms. Olsen's deposition, she agreed she had taken the above-listed courses and 
that the payments listed above were the only payments she made. (R. 115-23, 142, 144-
57.) Instead of disputing the amounts, Ms. Olsen changed her theory and blamed the 
University for failing to deduct the amounts from her credit card, stating that it was the 
University's error even though she initially disputed the amounts and that therefore she 
should not have to pay for the classes she took or textbooks she used. (R. 115-23, 142, 
144-57.) 
Because Ms. Olsen never paid the debt, the University sent it to a collections 
agency. (R. 85, 96-97, 128-33.) Indeed, the debt was included in a January 2006 
settlement agreement between Ms. Olsen and one of the collection agencies whom she 
also sued as a result of these transactions, which settlement agreement provided for a 
payment by the collections agency to the University of $678. (R. 85, 96-97, 128-33.) In 
opposing the University's motion for summary judgment, Ms. Olsen provided no 
evidence of severe emotional distress or physical or mental illness as a result of the 
University's alleged conduct and admitted that she never sought medical or mental health 
care for anything that the University did. (R. 125-26.) 
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Summary of Argument 
Ms. Olsen alleged that the University wrongfully attempted to collect $678 for 
unpaid tuition and fees. Based upon this allegation, Ms. Olsen brought seven related 
causes of action, including breach of contract, a violation of the Federal Fair Credit 
Reporting Act ("FCRA"), a violation of the Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act 
("UCSPA"), intentional and negligent misrepresentation, and intentional and negligent 
infliction of emotional distress. 
Ms. Olsen's claims can be divided into three categories: (i) claims concerning the 
$588 in unpaid tuition and a $30 late fee ("Tuition Claims"); (ii) claims concerning the 
$60 e-Resource or electronic resource fee the University charged when Ms. Olsen 
accessed an online electronic text ("e-Resource Claims"); and (iii) claims advancing tort 
theories of misrepresentation and emotional distress related to the University's collection 
efforts ("Tort Claims"). The Tuition Claims fail because Ms. Olsen provided no 
evidence to dispute her own deposition testimony that she, in fact, did not pay tuition for 
all of her classes. In addition, the FCRA claims concerning the tuition debt fail because 
there is no evidence the University misreported the status of Ms. Olsen's account, or 
otherwise failed to investigate or respond to her complaints. Finally, the UCSPA claim 
concerning the tuition debt fails because there is no evidence of deceptive or 
unconscionable acts on the part of the University. 
The e-Resource Claims fail because Ms. Olsen provided no evidence that the 
University agreed to waive the fee for her electronic textbook. Contrary to Ms. Olsen's 
assertions in the opening brief—made for the first time on appeal without record 
support—there is no evidence that she discussed the e-Resource fee with anyone at the 
o 
University. Instead, the University properly charged that fee after Ms. Olsen accessed the 
reading materials for the class she attended and received credit for taking. 
Finally, the Tort Claims fail because there is no evidence the University (i) made a 
misrepresentation, let alone that Ms. Olsen relied upon a misrepresentation; or 
(ii) engaged in outrageous conduct, let alone outrageous conduct that caused Ms. Olsen 
emotional distress. In addition, the state law tort claims fail because they are preempted 
by the Fair Credit Reporting Act. For all of these reasons, the district court did not err in 
granting summary judgment. 
Argument 
It is undisputed that Ms. Olsen never paid for all of the classes she took at the 
University. It also is undisputed that the University charged Ms. Olsen precisely what it 
agreed to charge her in tuition. Finally, it is undisputed that the University did not agree 
to waive the electronic reading materials fee, or e-Resource fee, in conjunction with 
MAT 536, a fee Ms. Olsen agreed to pay when she logged into the class website and 
accessed the reading materials. Based upon these undisputed facts, Ms. Olsen's claims 
were properly dismissed. 
I. The District Court Properly Dismissed Ms. Olsen's Claims Related to the 
University's Efforts to Collect Unpaid Tuition 
All claims related to unpaid tuition fail because Ms. Olsen admits that she owed, 
but did not pay, all of her tuition. Although Ms. Olsen admitted in her deposition that she 
failed to pay tuition, in the opening brief she attempts to confuse the issue by jumping 
between invoices and account statements. This does not change the fact that Ms. Olsen 
owed tuition that she never paid, in the exact amount the University has maintained. A 
review of the history of her tuition payments confirms this. 
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Ms. Olsen's nonpayment first came to light in August of 2004, when the 
University sent an account statement showing a balance owing of $750, including $680 
for MAT 536, and the $60 e-Resource fee. Shortly thereafter, Ms. Olsen contacted the 
University and told them the bill was wrong in two ways: (i) she had paid for MAT 534 
in June and that payment should apply to MAT 536, and (ii) her academic advisor had 
told her she would not have to pay the difference between MAT 536 and MAT 534. She 
also disputed the e-Resource fee. 
In response, the University adjusted her account in two ways. First, it honored the 
reduced tuition amount that her academic advisor had quoted by lowering the tuition to 
$588 (the cost of MAT 534). Second, the University adjusted Ms. Olsen's account to 
show that the balance of $588 for tuition was due to the nonpayment of the online courses 
SPE 532 and MED 509. Accordingly, the next statement reflected a total balance due of 
$648, consisting of $588 in tuition for SPE 532 and MED 509, and $60 for electronic 
resources. Notwithstanding the account adjustment, Ms. Olsen continued to refuse to 
pay. As a result, the University assessed a late fee. The University sent Ms. Olsen a 
statement in October of 2004 that included the $30 late fee for nonpayment of tuition, for 
atotaldueof$678. 
Because Ms. Olsen continued to refuse to pay, the University sent her account to 
collections. Prior to doing so, however, it reapplied her June payments to the oldest 
outstanding invoices (SPE 532 and MED 509) to bring the account as current as possible 
before attempting collections. Subsequent statements therefore reflected the same 
balance due of $678, including tuition of $588, for MAT 536, along with the $60 e-
Resource fee, and $30 late fee. In other words, the only thing that changed is the unpaid 
tuition was attached to the last class attended, but the amount owed remained constant. 
Confirming this, at Ms. Olsen's deposition she testified that she had not paid for 
all of her classes. She first reviewed an account summary showing all of the courses she 
attended, and all of the payments she made on her account. Ms. Olsen admitted that she 
took the courses listed and that the payments made on her account were the only 
payments she made. When the two were added up, she admitted, it showed the balance 
the University maintains was due. (R. 115-21, 142, 144-57.) When pressed to explain 
the inconsistency between her claims and the balance due, she blamed the University for 
not having charged her credit card for the amount due: 
A: ... They never notified me when I paid for 536 that 
there was an outstanding balance. I don't - 1 think that's 
unreasonable to come back two months later and say, "Hey, 
you didn't pay us," when in fact I did authorize payment, so . 
55 
Q: Authorized payment but didn't necessarily pay for it? 
A: It's not my responsibility to do their accounting for 
them. 
Q: I understand. 
A: So I feel, you know what? Ifthey-it was their error. 
They should have taken out the money if it was owed, and I -
they had authorization even in August. 
Q: So you think it was their bad, they lose, they didn't 
take it out in time? 
A: Yes.... 
(R. 404-05.) 
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Based upon her admission of not paying for all of her classes at the University, the 
district court properly dismissed any claims related to the collection of unpaid tuition. 
A. Ms. Olsen's FCRA claim related to unpaid tuition was properly 
dismissed because the University reported her account accurately and 
investigated her disputes 
Ms. Olsen's FCRA claim fails as a matter of law because she owed the University 
the very money the University claims she owed it. FCRA requires furnishers of 
information to credit reporting agencies regarding consumers to provide accurate 
information, and if a furnisher of information receives notice of a consumer dispute from 
a credit reporting agency, it triggers an obligation to investigate and report the results of 
the investigation. 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(a) - (b) (2004). 
The undisputed evidence here shows that the University satisfied its obligations 
under the FCRA. First, it is undisputed that Ms. Olsen owed the debt. Second, 
Ms. Olsen presented no evidence that that the University misrepresented or otherwise 
inaccurately reported her past-due status, or failed to investigate or respond to her 
continuous disputes.1 Therefore, summary judgment was appropriate. 
In the opening brief, Ms. Olsen claims that her FCRA claim survives because she 
established at least two different occasions that she disputed the debt with the University. 
This new, and unpreserved, claim fails because there is simply no evidence that she made 
such dispute. Under FCRA, the legal duty to investigate and correct and report errors 
arises only upon notice of a dispute, not from the consumer herself, but from the 
consumer reporting agency. Whisenant v. First Naf 1 Bank & Trust Co., 258 F. Supp. 2d 
1312, 1316 (N.D. Okla. 2003) ("[T]hese duties are only triggered after a furnisher of 
information receives notice of a consumer dispute from a credit reporting agency. In the 
absence of such notification, no duty arises.") (emphasis added). 
Regardless, the correspondence from the credit reporting agencies—which is in the 
record—suggests that reports of Ms. Olsen's disputes were reported to the University, 
and that after further investigation the University confirmed that the debt was reported 
accurately (R. 232-33), a fact that Ms. Olsen did not and cannot dispute in light of her 
own admission. 
1 1 
B. The UCSPA Claims Related to Unpaid Tuition Were Properly 
Dismissed Because There Is No Evidence the University Misled or 
Otherwise Acted in a Deceptive or Unconscionable Manner 
In the district court, Ms. Olsen claimed that the University violated the UCSPA 
with regard to tuition by misrepresenting (i) the amounts of tuition due on her account, 
(ii) that she owed a debt, (iii) the amount of the debt before it was referred to collections, 
and (iv) whether a late fee could be applied. (R. 7-8, 273-77.) Ms. Olsen's admission 
that she both owed the debt and failed to pay the debt defeats every one of these claims. 
The University could not have misrepresented the debt to a third party because the 
University's calculation of the debt was accurate. In addition, the undisputed evidence 
showed that the University tried to work with Ms. Olsen, that it honored Ms. Olsen's 
explanation of the tuition match her academic counselor allegedly agreed to and adjusted 
her account downward, and, per her requests and repeated discussions with the 
University, adjusted the allocation of her payments to clarify the classes for which tuition 
was originally owed, i.e., the two online classes, SPE 532 and MED 509. 
With regard to the imposition of the late fee, the University went beyond its own 
policy and did not impose a late fee until the University had (i) explained to Ms. Olsen 
the status of her account and (ii) given her a chance to bring the account current. Even 
after the late fee had been imposed, the undisputed evidence shows that Ms. Olsen was 
given another chance to bring the account current, for which the University offered to 
waive the late fee and the e-Resource fee. (R. 206-07.) Ms. Olsen refused to pay. Thus, 
the University did not deal unreasonably with Ms. Olsen with regard to the late fee. 
2
 The late fee policy that applied to Ms. Olsen at the time was that a $30 fee would be 
assessed "When tuition is not paid prior to the first class session of a course." (R. 89, 
171-72.) 
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Ms. Olsen also argues that the University violated the UCSPA by not disclosing 
the late fee in the September 9, 2004 invoice the University sent Ms. Olsen. She argues 
that the University's own Customer Account History, a separate document produced later 
in discovery, shows that the late fee was imposed on September 4, 2004, but was not 
disclosed in the September 9, 2004 invoice. (AOB at 28.) This allegation does not 
constitute a UCSPA violation, but, assuming it did, it finds no record support. Instead, 
the Customer Account History shows that the late fee was not imposed until 
September 10, 2004, after the September 9, 2004 invoice, and not on September 4 as 
asserted by Ms. Olsen. (R. 198.) 
With regard to the reallocation of Ms. Olsen's payments, Ms. Olsen argues that 
such an act is unconscionable because Ms. Olsen was never given a choice as to where 
her payments would be allocated, and refers "by analogy" to concepts under the Fair 
Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCA"). (AOB at 29.) Ms. Olsen seems to imply that 
she was entitled to make decisions regarding the University's internal accounting system 
or to be given notice as to how the University tracks and assigns revenues. Ms. Olsen 
offers no legal support for her claim because there is none. The University is not 
required to report to Ms. Olsen the details of its internal accounting system or to notify 
Ms. Olsen prior to its own application of payments to negative account balances. 
Regardless, Ms. Olsen's argument is contrary to the record, which shows account 
adjustment at Ms. Olsen's behest. Ms. Olsen's June 2004 payment, which Ms. Olsen 
made ostensibly to pay for a Utah Campus course, was internally applied to the negative 
account balance arising as a result of the two online courses which had not been paid for 
at the time. (R. 84-85, 111-13, 137-38, 389-92.) When Ms. Olsen received the August 
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bill showing a balance for the Utah Campus course, she contacted the University to 
explain that she had paid for MAT 536. (R. 107, 124,135, 163.) In response to Ms. 
Olsen's concerns the University reapplied her June 2004 payment in its internal system to 
show Ms. Olsen that when she had transferred from the online campus to the Utah 
Campus and made a June 2004 payment, she still had a negative balance .from two 
unpaid-for online courses. (R. 389-92.) Thus, contrary to Ms. Olsen's statement, the 
reallocation of funds was, in fact, done in direct response to Ms. Olsen's concerns. Only 
after Ms. Olsen continued to ignore the past-due amounts did the University internally 
reapply the payments to the earliest account balances before pursing collections. (R. 111-
13,137-38.) 
Finally, Ms. Olsen's reference to the FDCA is irrelevant. The FDCA has no 
application in this case because (i) the FDCA applies only to debt collection agencies; 
(ii) Ms. Olsen has raised no FDCA claims; and (iii) the specific provision cited, 15 
U.S.C. § 1692h, applies, by its own terms, only to prevent a debt collector (which the 
University is not) from applying a payment on a debt by a consumer who owes multiple 
debts to any debt which is disputed by the consumer. For all of these reasons, 
Ms. Olsen's argument fails as a matter of law. This court should affirm. 
II. Ms. Olsen's E-Resource Claims Also Fail as a Matter of Law 
A. The Breach of Contract Claim Concerning the E-Resource Fee Fails 
Because There is No Evidence the University Agreed to Waive the Fee 
The district court also properly dismissed Ms. Olsen's breach of contract claim 
with regard to the e-Resource fee because there was no evidence of an agreement by the 
University to waive that fee. Indeed, the only contract in existence with regard to that fee 
was the one created by Ms. Olsen when she accessed the electronic reading materials and 
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clicked on the link to download them after having been informed of the accompanying 
$60 charge. At best, Ms. Olsen's argument is that the University somehow waived that 
fee without discussing that fee with Ms. Olsen, an argument that has nothing to do with 
breaching a contract. 
In the spring of 2004, Ms. Olsen registered to take MAT 534, the last of the series 
of classes she needed to take at the University to complete the requirements for her 
teaching certificate. Before the course started, however, the University cancelled MAT 
534 and offered Ms. Olsen MAT 536 in its place. MAT 536 was more expensive than 
MAT 534. However, the University agreed to "accept as payment in full for MAT 536 
the amount she had previously been quoted for the cancelled course MAT 534." (R. 6.) 
Ms. Olsen testified that her academic counselor told her that "I would receive the same 
price for MAT 536 as I would for MAT 534." (R. 108.) She also testified that she spoke 
with Jill Muir, education department chair, about "whether she would be charged 
additional funds for having to change to MAT 536," and that Ms. Muir said that she 
would not. (R. 109-10.) Thus, the extent of an agreement between Ms. Olsen and the 
University was to match the lower tuition of MAT 534, and there is no dispute that the 
University did match the tuition. 
Nevertheless, Ms. Olsen argues that the University's agreement to match tuition 
should be deemed an agreement to waive book fees as well. Ms. Olsen offered no 
evidentiary support for this novel claim. Indeed, the only evidence presented below 
supported the undisputed fact that there was no discussion of book charges, required 
texts, or an e-Resource fee. (R. 108-10.) 
In order for a contract to exist, there must be a "meeting of the minds" with regard 
to the essential elements of the agreement, "which must be spelled out, either expressly or 
impliedly, with sufficient definiteness to be enforced." Prince, Yeates & Geldzahler v. 
Young, 2004 UT 26, ^ 16, 94 P.3d 179. Thus, to prevail on her claim for breach of 
contract, Ms. Olsen would need to show some evidence that the University somehow 
created a separate contract in agreeing to waive the e-Resource electronic textbook fee— 
the same fee charged to all students in that class and all classes requiring an electronic 
textbook. Ms. Olsen presented no such evidence, and no such evidence exists, even if 
agreeing to waive a contractual right could itself be a contract capable of breach. 
Indeed, the only contract addressing the electronic reading materials e-Resource 
fee was not the agreement to match tuition as Olsen argues, but the contract created by 
Ms. Olsen when she accessed the online reading materials in exchange for her agreement 
to pay the accompanying $60 charge. Ms. Olsen denies notice of such a contract, but the 
undisputed fads reveal otherwise. There is no dispute that information on the e-Resource 
fee is readily available in the student catalog, as well as in the online class description 
and website for each class, including MAT 536. That online description described the 
required readings, advised the student of the charge for accessing the online reading 
materials, and contained the link to accept the charges and access and download the 
electronic text. As the University's Director of Finance testified, 
Each student has an online account with the University listing 
their courses. Students can click on individual classes to 
check on assignments, review the course syllabus, etc. These 
individual class websites also set forth the class requirements, 
including required textbooks or electronic reading materials. 
Additionally, if the class has electronic reading materials, as 
opposed to a hard-copy textbook, there will be a link on the 
webpage to the electronic reading materials, along with an 
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explanation of the $60 e-Resource fee. Students are not 
charged for the e-Resource fee unless and until they actually 
access the electronic reading materials. 
(R. 323-24.) In other words, the only way she could have accessed and been charged for 
the electronic reading materials is if she clicked on the link with the explanation of the 
charge, thereby creating the contract to pay $60 in exchange for access to .the required 
materials. (R. 324.) Because Ms. Olsen used the materials for the class, it was 
appropriate for the University to charge her for those materials. 
In response to this evidence, Ms. Olsen offered nothing to the contrary, including 
nothing to suggest that she did not access the reading materials, but instead now argues 
on appeal that that this evidence by affidavit should be summarily ignored, suggesting it 
is contrary to prior deposition testimony, and stating that "[i]n deposition, when this 
subject came up, she admitted she didn't know if this statement applied to Plaintiff." 
(AOB at 24.) In addition to being at odds with the cited deposition testimony, this new 
argument is unsupported by any citation to the record, and the record does not support it. 
The district court properly dismissed Ms. Olsen's breach of contract claim ruling that the 
undisputed facts showed no agreement by the University to waive the e-Resource fee. 
B. Ms. Olsen's Argument Concerning the E-Resource Fee Is Unpreserved 
and Unsupported by the Record 
The claim for breach of contract that Ms. Olsen presents on appeal is significantly 
different than the claim she presented to the district court. On appeal, Ms. Olsen suggests 
that the contract was not the one created in her discussions with her academic advisor and 
the department chair, but rather "consists of the email offer and acceptance" of May 24-
25, 2004, where she was given information for MAT 534, and a subsequent confirmation 
of registration for MAT 536 which makes no mention of tuition. (AOB at 19.) Then 
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based upon that new contract theory, Ms. Olsen argues for the first time that the district 
court found an ambiguity "based on general relationship expectations," and, with reliance 
on unsupported facts, argues that thereby the court wrongly determined that the 
University had a right to collect the e-Resource fee. (AOB at 20.) 
Ms. Olsen's argument fails for several reasons. First, Ms. Olsen'&new theories 
and arguments cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, and this Court should decline 
to address them. Jacob v. Bezzant 2009 UT 37, ^ 34, 212 P.3d 535 ("[W]e do not 
address arguments 'brought for the first time on appeal unless the [district] court 
committed plain error or exceptional circumstances exist.'") (citations omitted). 
Second, Ms. Olsen's argument is based upon a false premise that the district court 
somehow found an ambiguity. That is not the case. Instead, the district court determined 
that the undisputed facts showed no agreement by the University to waive the e-Resource 
fee. (R. 436:39.) 
Third, Ms. Olsen's argument on the creation of the new contract is unsupported by 
the record. The May 24-25 email exchange that Ms. Olsen suggests creates a contract is 
nothing more than preliminary questions by Ms. Olsen regarding MAT 534 and MAT 
536 to decide which class to take, her academic counselor's response that "MAT/534 is 
offered as a directed study which is $294/credit hour plus a $250 directed study fee," and 
Ms. Olsen's response thanking him for the information and stating that "I've decided to 
do the MAT 534 as a directed study. What do I need to do to register for that?" (R. 202-
03.) There was no contract, ambiguous or otherwise, created by this simple request for 
information and the academic advisor's response answering her questions regarding a 
course she never took. Moreover, even if a contract could somehow have been created 
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by that exchange, it had nothing to do with MAT 536, the class she eventually did take, 
and the class under which her contract claim arose. Indeed, it is clear from a simple 
reading of the emails that this whole exchange occurred before MAT 534 was cancelled 
and MAT 536 was offered as a substitute. 
The evidence before the district court reveals that, as a matter of law, the 
University fulfilled its agreement to match tuition, never agreed to waive the e-Resource 
fee, and provided Ms. Olsen adequate notice of the e-Resource charge. The district court 
did not err in dismissing Ms. Olsen's breach of contract claim as a matter of law. 
C. Ms. Olsen's E-Resource Claim Under the UCSPA Fails for the Same 
Reasons 
For her claim under the Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act ("UCSPA") 
concerning the e-Resource fee, Ms. Olsen continues to rely on her novel contract claim 
based on the May 24-25 emails, arguing that those emails established "that she did not 
receive actual or constructive notice that enrolling in MAT/534 (later MAT/536) would 
obligate her to pay Defendant a $60 e-Resource fee," and that the "May 24, 2004, email 
offering MAT/534 for $294/credit hour plus a $250 directed study fee is a written 
representation concerning a price advantage that did not exist," and therefore violates the 
UCSPA. (AOB at 25.) This argument is similarly unpreserved and similarly finds no 
record support. 
Ms. Olsen's argument fails for a number of reasons. First, it is not preserved. 
Jacob, 2009 UT 37, f 34. Second, Ms. Olsen's argument of lack of notice is based upon 
an email exchange about MAT 534, the class that she never took. It had nothing to do 
with MAT 536, the class she eventually did take and did access the electronic reading 
materials for. Indeed, the email exchange ends with Ms. Olsen saying "I've decided to 
do the MAT 534 as a directed study. What do I need to do to register for that?" (R. 202-
03.) Of course this email exchange does not give her notice of the e-Resource fee in 
conjunction with the reading materials for MAT 536—it had nothing to do with MAT 
536, but was created long before Ms. Olsen decided to take MAT 536, and long before 
she accessed the online reading materials for that class. 
Third, Ms. Olsen's new argument on appeal that the e-Resource fee was unrelated 
to any materials cost that the Utah Campus instituted, and that all other campuses simply 
absorb the costs of the electronic resources, is unsupported by any valid citation to the 
record. The record contains no evidence either way regarding the cost of reading 
materials, the e-Resource program, or any evidence regarding any campuses other than 
the Utah and online campuses. Notably absent is any indication by Ms. Olsen that she 
did not have the benefit of the reading materials. The fact that she used the materials and 
did not pay for them would, ironically, support an unjust enrichment claim by the 
University. 
Fourth, Ms. Olsen's argument that she never had actual or constructive notice of 
the e-Resource fee and that the University failed to disclose this charge is contrary to the 
undisputed facts. The record shows that the University explained the e-Resource charge, 
and provided Ms. Olsen actual or constructive notice, in the catalog (which Ms. Olsen 
admits), on her online account and individual class description for MAT 536, and finally 
on the link she had to click to access the reading materials. Only after she clicked on that 
link to accept the charge and download the reading materials would she have been 
charged the fee. (R. 323-24.) Ms. Olsen has never claimed that she did not receive the 
benefit of the reading materials—only that she never knew about the attendant charges. 
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In the end, it is difficult to understand how Ms. Olsen could have believed her 
textbooks were free. Regardless, the evidence reveals that the University provided 
adequate notice of the electronic resources charge before the charge was incurred. With 
that notice, Ms. Olsen purchased the required text. The district court did not err in 
dismissing her claim under UCSPA. 
III. Ms. Olsen's State Law Tort Claims Fail As a Matter of Law 
A. Ms. Olsen Provided No Evidence of a Misrepresentation or 
Unconscionable Conduct 
Ms. Olsen's misrepresentation claims also were correctly dismissed by the district 
court. An actionable misrepresentation occurs when a false representation of an existing 
material fact is made to induce reliance thereon, and upon which the plaintiff reasonably 
relies to his or her detriment. Rawson v. Conover, 2001 UT 24, ffif 27-31, 20 P.3d 876 
(stating elements of cause of action and explaining difference between fraudulent or 
intentional misrepresentation and negligent misrepresentation). Here, the University did 
not make a misrepresentation. 
Ms. Olsen argues the numerous invoices are misrepresentations because the 
amounts listed and the classes listed changed. What Ms. Olsen fails to acknowledge, 
however, is that the only time the amount actually changed was when the University 
adjusted her account downward after being informed of the oral agreement between 
Ms. Olsen and her academic advisor. Thereafter, the amount remained constant until the 
imposition of the late fee. With regard to the listed classes changing, the changes were in 
fact initiated by Ms. Olsen when she disputed the invoice in August of 2004. To 
demonstrate that she had a negative balance for SPE 532 and MED 509, the University 
adjusted her account to reflect nonpayment for those two online classes. Only after she 
continued to withhold payment did the University reapply payments to the earlier 
invoices to bring the account as current as possible before initiating collections. 
During that time, the amount remained constant except for the imposition of the 
late fee. There were no false representations. The invoices reflected the amount still 
owing, which Ms. Olsen admitted not having paid. Based upon the record, Ms. Olsen's 
claims for misrepresentation fail as a matter of law. 
Beyond Ms. Olsen's admission that she never paid for the courses, which 
undermines entirely her claims of misrepresentation, her two claims for misrepresentation 
(intentional or fraudulent and negligent) were properly dismissed because there is no 
evidence Ms. Olsen relied upon the alleged misrepresentations. 
While Ms. Olsen claimed to have relied upon the University's representation that 
she owed money, that representation is accurate. Ms. Olsen does not claim to have relied 
upon any other representation. To the contrary, the debt was included in a January 2006 
settlement agreement between Ms. Olsen and one of the collection agencies whom she 
also sued as a result of these transactions, which settlement agreement provided for a 
payment by the collections agency to the University of $678. (R. 85, 96-97, 128-33.) 
Absent reliance, the misrepresentation claims fail as a matter of law. 
B. Ms. Olsen Provided No Evidence of Emotional Distress or That the 
University Acted in a Deceptive or Unconscionable Manner 
Because the University appropriately attempted to collect a debt that Ms. Olsen 
admits she owed, the University did nothing improper to cause emotional distress when it 
reported the status of Ms. Olsen's account by sending her account to collections and 
reporting her delinquency to the credit bureaus. These claims also were correctly 
dismissed for the additional reason that there was no evidence of any outrageous or 
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intolerable conduct by the University and no evidence of actual emotional distress or 
physical injury.3 
1. No Evidence of Outrageous or Intolerable Conduct 
In D.D.Z. v. Molerwav Freight Lines, Inc., 880 P.2d 1, 3 n.2 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) 
this court articulated three elements for intentional infliction of emotional-distress, 
including "that defendant intentionally engaged in conduct toward the plaintiff that is 
considered outrageous and intolerable in that it offends generally accepted standards of 
decency and morality." There is no evidence of any such conduct here. Rather, the only 
evidence shows the University's asserting its rights to collect a debt owed by Ms. Olsen, 
through demand letters and account statements, and the University's responding to 
Ms. Olsen's questions and correspondence by trying to explain the situation. Such 
conduct by the University does not rise to the "outrageous and intolerable" level required 
by law. Prince v. Bear River Mut. Ins. Co.. 2002 UT 68, If 38, 56 P.3d 524 ("Outrageous 
conduct, for purposes of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress, is conduct 
that evokes 'outrage or revulsion; it must be more than unreasonable, unkind, or unfair.' 
Additionally, conduct is not outrageous simply because it is 'tortious, injurious, or 
malicious, or because it would give rise to punitive damages, or because it is illegal.'") 
(citations omitted). Ms. Olsen's claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress fails 
as a matter of law. 
Ms. Olsen argues to the court that she was damaged as a result of the University's 
administrative withdrawal of her in September 2004. It is unclear whether she makes this 
argument in connection with her misrepresentation claims, her emotional distress claims, 
or both. Regardless, the undisputed facts show that her administrative withdrawal was a 
result of the nonpayment on her account, since by the time it took place, Ms. Olsen had 
already completed all of her coursework, received all necessary credits for her elementary 
teaching certificate, and in fact obtained her elementary teaching certificate and a new 
job, all prior to the administrative withdrawal. (R. 411-13.) 
2. No Evidence of Emotional Distress 
The district court correctly dismissed Ms. Olsen's claims for infliction of 
emotional distress for the additional reason that there is no evidence of several emotional 
distress or physical injury. With regard to the required element in the context of 
intentional infliction of emotional distress, Molerway Freight Lines articulated as the 
third element of that claim a showing of "severe emotional distress." 880 P.2d at 3 n.2. 
Negligent infliction requires the following element: "physical harm manifested by 
objective symptomatology." Handy v. Union Pac. R.R., 841 P.2d 1210, 1217-18, 1218 
n.10 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). And "awards for negligently inflicted emotional distress arise 
when physical or mental illness results from the emotional trauma itself." Dalley v. Utah 
Valley Reg'l Med. Ctr., 791 P.2d 193, 201 (Utah 1990). Put another way, the "plaintiff 
must experience either physical or mental symptoms as a result of the incident." Lawson 
v. Salt Lake Trappers, Inc., 901 P.2d 1013, 1016 (Utah 1995). Therefore, the claim 
should be dismissed unless the plaintiff "experienced severe mental illness as a result of 
the incident." IdL at 1016-17. 
Here, Ms. Olsen failed to allege, and there was no evidence of, any demonstrable 
physical or mental illness or substantive severe emotional injury arising as a result of the 
University's alleged conduct. To the contrary, in her deposition, Ms. Olsen admitted 
never having sought medical or mental health care for anything that the University is 
alleged to have done. Nonetheless, in response to the University's summary judgment 
motion, Ms. Olsen submitted an affidavit of alleged distress, including "severe stress and 
nervousness, sleeplessness, fear, and anxiety," tight muscles, and weight gain. (R. 187.) 
Yet this affidavit fails to create a factual issue because it contradicts her deposition 
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testimony. At her deposition, Ms. Olsen was asked to describe her damages. She 
responded that she was seeking "attorney fees, refund of the resource and late fees, 
compensatory damages for time and stress," and summarized, "for the most part, I'm 
looking to get back what I have had to put out in order to resolve this." Ms. Olsen denied 
seeking medical or psychological treatment. (R. 410-11.) 
Under Utah law, "when a party takes a clear position in a deposition, that is not 
modified on cross-examination, he may not thereafter raise an issue of fact by his own 
affidavit which contradicts his deposition, unless he can provide an explanation of the 
discrepancy." Harnicher v. University of Utah Med. Ctr., 962 P.2d 67, 71 (Utah 1998). 
Therefore, Ms. Olsen provided no evidence of emotional distress. 
Regardless, the affidavit falls short of evidence of the required severe distress. 
Indeed, a careful reading reveals that virtually all of her emotional injury can be 
attributed to the litigation that she initiated. (R. 187 ("It has been incredibly stressful 
constantly rehashing old arguments, reading and rereading through documents, preparing 
for the deposition, and worrying about the strain on my finances. That it goes on and on 
is stressful.").) Moreover, "the 'emotional distress suffered must be severe; it must be 
such that a reasonable [person], normally constituted, would be unable to adequately cope 
with the mental stress engendered by the circumstances of the case.'" Harnicher, 962 
P.2d at 71-72 (quoting Hansen v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 858 P.2d 970, 975 (Utah 
1993)). In Mountain Fuel where the plaintiff similarly alleged anxiety and sleeplessness, 
the court explained that such symptoms did not constitute compensable distress: "Such 
symptoms do not constitute illness or injury . . . . Everyone must deal with stress and 
anxiety in daily life; most of us experience occasional sleeplessness. Transitory 
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sleeplessness and anxiety do not amount to the type of emotional distress with which a 
reasonable person, normally constituted, would be unable to cope." Hansen v. Mountain 
Fuel Supply Co., 858 P.2d 970, 975 (Utah 1993). 
In other words, "mere unsubstantiated opinions that they have suffered severe 
anxiety . . . do not create a triable issue of fact that would withstand summary judgment." 
Id. Similarly, the symptoms averred by Ms. Olsen do not rise to the level of severe 
emotional distress, but rather constitute the normal daily stress, anxiety, and sleeplessness 
that the reasonable person is expected to cope with—in this case the stress created by the 
litigation she initiated. Ms. Olsen's claims for infliction of emotional distress fail as a 
matter of law and were properly dismissed by the district court. 
C. Ms. Olsen's State Law Claims Are Preempted By FCRA 
Finally, Ms. Olsen's state common law claim for breach of contract, claim under 
the Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act, common law fraud/misrepresentation claims, and 
her common law claims for infliction of emotional distress fail as a matter of law because 
they are preempted by FCRA. They are preempted because they are based upon the same 
facts and circumstances giving rise to her third cause of action under the FCRA, where 
she alleged violations of § 1681s-2 of the FCRA. (R. 8-9.) Because her state law claims 
are based upon conduct regulated by the FCRA, those claims must yield to the FCRA, 
and therefore dismissal below was proper. 
Title 15, Section 1681t of the FCRA, 15 U.S.C. § 1681t, sets forth the applicable 
preemption statement: "No requirement or prohibition may be imposed under the laws of 
any State . . . with respect to any subject matter regulated under . . . section 1681s-2 of 
this title, relating to the responsibilities of persons who furnish information to consumer 
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reporting agencies . . . . " 15 U.S.C. § 1681t(b)(l)(F) (2004). This means that if the 
allegations supporting the state law claims concern conduct regulated by § 1681s-2, then 
those state law claims are preempted. Knudson v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 513 F. Supp. 
2d 1255, 1260 (M.D. Ala. 2007) ("The violations of state law which he has alleged 
concern conduct which is regulated by § 1681s-2. Under the plain language of § 
1681t(b)(l)(F), therefore, [plaintiffs] state law claims are preempted.") 
Ms. Olsen argues that the above language does not apply by reason of the express 
preservation of state law claims provision of the FCRA which states, as correctly quoted 
by Ms. Olsen, "Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c)t this title does not annul . . . 
the laws of any State " (AOB at 32, quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1681t(a) (emphasis 
added).) Ms. Olsen fails to mention the "except as provided" language. In fact, 
subsection (b)(1)(F) of that section sets forth the relevant exception: "No requirement or 
prohibition may be imposed under the laws of any State—(1) with respect to any subject 
matter regulated under—... (F) section 1681s-2 of this title " 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1681t(b)(l)(F) (2004). Thus, the state law preservation provision is of no effect, and 
Ms. Olsen's state law claims are in fact preempted because they are based on conduct 
regulated by § 1681s-2. 
Conclusion 
The district court correctly dismissed Ms. Olsen's claims based on the 
University's efforts to collect past-due tuition because there is no evidence that Ms. Olsen 
did not owe the money to the University. Additionally, her claims were correctly 
dismissed because the undisputed facts showed that (i) the University never misreported 
the status of Ms. Olsen's account or otherwise failed to properly investigate or respond to 
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her complaints; and (ii) the University never acted deceptively or unconscionably with 
regard to its efforts to report and collect the debt. 
The district court also correctly dismissed Ms. Olsen's claims based on the 
University's appropriate imposition of a $60 e-Resource electronic textbook fee because 
there is no evidence that the University agreed to waive that fee. Ms. Olsen had notice of 
the fee, just like every other University student, and Ms. Olsen accessed and downloaded 
the reading materials for use in one of her classes. 
Finally, the district court correctly dismissed Ms. Olsen's tort claims because there 
was no evidence that (i) the University misrepresented Ms. Olsen's account; 
(ii) Ms. Olsen relied upon any representations; (iii) the University engaged in 
unreasonable or intolerable actions to collect the debt; or (iv) Ms. Olsen suffered 
emotional distress. In addition, Ms. Olsen's state law claims fail because they are 
preempted by the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act. This court should affirm. 
Dated this 27th day of May, 2010. 
Snell&WilmerL.L.P. 
David P. Williams 
Attorneys for Appellee, University of 
Phoenix 
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LAW & ORDER 
Case No. 060404298 
Judge Robert Adkins 
This matter came before the Court on the Motion for Summary Judgment of defendant, 
The University of Phoenix, Inc. (the "University"). Oral argument was heard by the Court on 
November 5, 2008. Chad M. Steur appeared on behalf of the plaintiff, Susan Olsen ("Ms. 
Olsen"), and David P. Williams appeared on behalf of the University. The Court made a ruling 
dated November 5, 2008, granting the University's motion in its entirety, and directing its 
counsel to prepare an order. 
BASED UPON THE FOREGOING, the Court enters the following findings, conclusions, 
and order: 0 0 0 4 3 0 
1. Ms. Olsen, a former student at the University, brought this action in connection 
9259T70 
VD28789426 pages: 3 
with the University's efforts to collect a $678 debt from her for tuition, an electronic resource or 
e-Resource fee, and a late fee. 
2. Ms. Olsen contested the debt, claiming that she did not owe the amounts the 
University sought to collect, and claimed that the University's efforts in collecting the debt were 
wrongful. 
3. The Court finds that Ms. Olsen did not pay for all of her classes at the University, 
and that Ms. Olsen properly owed the University $588 for tuition plus a $30 late fee. 
4. The Court finds that the University agreed to reduce the tuition amount for MAT 
536 and in fact did so. However, the Court finds no agreement with regard to the e-Resource fee, 
and finds that the University properly charged Ms. Olsen the e-Resource fee in the amount of 
$60. 
5. Having found that Ms. Olsen did owe the University a total of $678, the Court 
concludes that the University did nothing wrong in trying to collect that amount from Ms. Olsen, 
and Ms. Olsen's claims against the University fail as a matter of law. 
ORDER 
WHEREFOR, the Court orders that defendant's Motion for Summary judgment is 
granted, and plaintiff's Complaint is dismissed with prejudice. 
/ 
// 
/// 
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TITLE 15. COMMERCE AND TRADE 
CHAPTER 41. CONSUMER CREDIT PROTECTION 
CREDIT REPORTING AGENCIES 
15 USCS § 1681S-2 (2004) 
§ 1681s-2. Responsibilities of furnishers of information to consumer reporting agencies [Caution: See prospective 
amendment note below.] 
(a) Duty of furnishers of information to provide accurate information. 
(1) Prohibition. 
(A) Reporting information with actual knowledge of errors. A person shall not furnish any information relating to 
a consumer to any consumer reporting agency if the person knows or has reasonable cause to believe that the 
information is inaccurate. 
(B) Reporting information after notice and confirmation of errors. A person shall not furnish information relating 
to a consumer to any consumer reporting agency if 
(i) the person has been notified by the consumer, at the address specified by the person for such notices, that 
specific Information is inaccurate; and 
(ii) the information is, in fact, inaccurate. 
(C) No address requirement. A person who clearly and conspicuously specifies to the consumer an address for 
notices referred to in subparagraph (B) shall not be subject to subparagraph (A); however, nothing in subparagraph 
(B) shall require a person to specify such an address. 
(D) Definition. For purposes of subparagraph (A), the term "reasonable cause to believe that the information is 
inaccurate" means having specific knowledge, other than solely allegations by the consumer, that would cause a 
reasonable person to have substantial doubts about the accuracy of the information. 
(2) Duty to correct and update information. A person who— 
(A) regularly and in the ordinary course of business furnishes information to one or more consumer reporting 
agencies about the person's transactions or experiences with any consumer; and 
(B) has furnished to a consumer reporting agency information that the person determines is not complete or 
accurate, 
shall promptly notify the consumer reporting agency of that determination and provide to the agency any 
corrections to that information, or any additional information, that is necessary to make the information provided by 
the person to the agency complete and accurate, and shall not thereafter furnish to the agency any of the 
information that remains not complete or accurate. 
(3) Duty to provide notice of dispute. If the completeness or accuracy of any information furnished by any person 
to any consumer reporting agency is disputed to such person by a consumer, the person may not furnish the 
Information to any consumer reporting agency without notice that such information is disputed by the consumer. 
(4) Duty to provide notice of closed accounts. A person who regularly and in the ordinary course of business 
furnishes information to a consumer reporting agency regarding a consumer who has a credit account with that 
person shall notify the agency of the voluntary closure of the account by the consumer, in information regularly 
furnished for the period in which the account is closed. 
(5) Duty to provide notice of delinquency of accounts. 
(A) In general. A person who furnishes information to a consumer reporting agency regarding a delinquent 
account being placed for collection, charged to profit or loss, or subjected to any similar action shall, not later than 
90 days after furnishing the information, notify the agency of the date of delinquency on the account, which shall be 
the month and year of the commencement of the delinquency on the account that immediately preceded the action. 
(B) Rule of construction. For purposes of this paragraph only, and provided that the consumer does not dispute 
the information, a person that furnishes information on a delinquent account that is placed for collection, charged for 
profit or loss, or subjected to any similar action, complies with this paragraph, if— 
(i) the person reports the same date of delinquency as that provided by the creditor to which the account was 
owed at the time at which the commencement of the delinquency occurred, if the creditor previously reported that 
date of delinquency to a consumer reporting agency; 
(ii) the creditor did not previously report the date of delinquency to a consumer reporting agency, and the 
person establishes and follows reasonable procedures to obtain the date of delinquency from the creditor or another 
reliable source and reports that date to a consumer reporting agency as the date of delinquency; or 
(iii) the creditor did not previously report the date of delinquency to a consumer reporting agency and the 
date of delinquency cannot be reasonably obtained as provided in clause (ii), the person establishes and follows 
reasonable procedures to ensure the date reported as the date of delinquency precedes the date on which the 
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account is placed for collection, charged to profit or loss, or subjected to any similar action, and reports such date to 
the credit reporting agency. 
(6) Duties of furnishers upon notice of identity theft-related information. 
(A) Reasonable procedures. A person that furnishes information to any consumer reporting agency shall have in 
place reasonable procedures to respond to any notification that it receives from a consumer reporting agency under 
section 605B [15 USCS 5 1681c-2] relating to information resulting from identity theft, to prevent that person from 
refurnishing such blocked information. 
(B) Information alleged to result from identity theft. If a consumer submits an identity theft report to a person 
who furnishes information to a consumer reporting agency at the address specified by that person for receiving such 
reports stating that information maintained by such person that purports to relate to the consumer resulted from 
identity theft, the person may not furnish such information that purports to relate to the consumer to any consumer 
reporting agency, unless the person subsequently knows or is informed by the consumer that the information is 
correct. 
(7) Negative information. 
(A) Notice to consumer required. 
(i) In general. If any financial institution that extends credit and regularly and in the ordinary course of 
business furnishes information to a consumer reporting agency described in section 603(p) [15 USCS § 1681a(p)] 
furnishes negative information to such an agency regarding credit extended to a customer, the financial institution 
shall provide a notice of such furnishing of negative information, in writing, to the customer. 
(ii) Notice effective for subsequent submissions. After providing such notice, the financial institution may 
submit additional negative information to a consumer reporting agency described in section 603(p) [15 USCS § 
_1681a(p)] with respect to the same transaction, extension of credit, account, or customer without providing 
additional notice to the customer. 
(B) Time of notice. 
(i) In general. The notice required under subparagraph (A) shall be provided to the customer prior to, or no 
later than 30 days after, furnishing the negative information to a consumer reporting agency described in section 
603(p) [15 USCS § 1681a(p)]. 
(ii) Coordination with new account disclosures. If the notice is provided to the customer prior to furnishing the 
negative information to a consumer reporting agency, the notice may not be included in the initial disclosures 
provided under section 127(a) of the Truth in Lending Act [15 USCS § 1637(a)]. 
(C) Coordination with other disclosures. The notice required under subparagraph (A)— 
(i) may be included on or with any notice of default, any billing statement, or any other materials provided to 
the customer; and 
(ii) must be clear and conspicuous. 
(D) Model disclosure. 
(i) Duty of Board to prepare. The Board shall prescribe a brief model disclosure a financial institution may use 
to comply with subparagraph (A), which shall not exceed 30 words. 
(ii) Use of model not required. No provision of this paragraph shall be construed as requiring a financial 
institution to use any such model form prescribed by the Board. 
(iii) Compliance using model. A financial institution shall be deemed to be in compliance with subparagraph 
(A) if the financial institution uses any such model form prescribed by the Board, or the financial institution uses any 
such model form and rearranges its format. 
(E) Use of notice without submitting negative information. No provision of this paragraph shall be construed as 
requiring a financial institution that has provided a customer with a notice described in subparagraph (A) to furnish 
negative information about the customer to a consumer reporting agency. 
(F) Safe harbor. A financial institution shall not be liable for failure to perform the duties required by this 
paragraph if, at the time of the failure, the financial institution maintained reasonable policies and procedures to 
comply with this paragraph or the financial institution reasonably believed that the institution is prohibited, by law, 
from contacting the consumer. 
(G) Definitions. For purposes of this paragraph, the following definitions shall apply: 
(i) Negative information. The term "negative information" means information concerning a customer's 
delinquencies, late payments, insolvency, or any form of default. 
(ii) Customer; financial institution. The terms "customer" and "financial institution" have the same meanings 
as in section 509 Public Law 106-102 [15 USCS 5 68091. 
(8) Ability of consumer to dispute information directly with furnisher. 
(A) In general. The Federal banking agencies, the National Credit Union Administration, and the Commission 
shall jointly prescribe regulations that shall identify the circumstances under which a furnisher shall be required to 
reinvestigate a dispute concerning the accuracy of information contained in a consumer report on the consumer, 
based on a direct request of a consumer. 
(B) Considerations. In prescribing regulations under subparagraph (A), the agencies shall weigh— 
(i) the benefits to consumers with the costs on furnishers and the credit reporting system; 
(ii) the impact on the overall accuracy and integrity of consumer reports of any such requirements; 
(iii) whether direct contact by the consumer with the furnisher would likely result in the most expeditious 
resolution of any such dispute; and 
(iv) the potential impact on the credit reporting process if credit repair organizations, as defined in section 403 
(3) [15 USCS 5 1679a(3)]f including entities that would be a credit repair organization, but for section 403(3)(B)(i) 
[15 USCS § 1679a(3)(B)(i)1f are able to circumvent the prohibition in subparagraph (G). 
(C) Applicability. Subparagraphs (D) through (G) shall apply in any circumstance identified under the regulations 
promulgated under subparagraph (A). 
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(D) Submitting a notice of dispute. A consumer who seeks to dispute the accuracy of information shall provide a 
dispute notice directly to such person at the address specified by the person for such notices that-
(i) identifies the specific information that is being disputed; 
(ii) explains the basis for the dispute; and 
(iii) includes all supporting documentation required by the furnisher to substantiate the basis of the dispute. 
(E) Duty of person after receiving notice of dispute. After receiving a notice of dispute from a consumer pursuant 
to subparagraph (D), the person that provided the information in dispute to a consumer reporting agency shall— 
(i) conduct an investigation with respect to the disputed information; 
(ii) review all relevant information provided by the consumer with the notice; 
(iii) complete such person's investigation of the dispute and report the results of the investigation to the 
consumer before the expiration of the period under section 611(a)(1) [15 USCS 5 1681i(a)(l)] within which a 
consumer reporting agency would be required to complete its action if the consumer had elected to dispute the 
information under that section; and 
(iv) if the investigation finds that the information reported was inaccurate, promptly notify each consumer 
reporting agency to which the person furnished the inaccurate information of that determination and provide to the 
agency any correction to that information that is necessary to make the information provided by the person 
accurate. 
(F) Frivolous or irrelevant dispute. 
(i) In general. This paragraph shall not apply if the person receiving a notice of a dispute from a consumer 
reasonably determines that the dispute is frivolous or irrelevant, including-
(I) by reason of the failure of a consumer to provide sufficient information to investigate the disputed 
information; or 
(II) the submission by a consumer of a dispute that is substantially the same as a dispute previously 
submitted by or for the consumer, either directly to the person or through a consumer reporting agency under 
subsection (b), with respect to which the person has already performed the person's duties under this paragraph or 
subsection (b), as applicable. 
(ii) Notice of determination. Upon making any determination under clause (i) that a dispute is frivolous or 
irrelevant, the person shall notify the consumer of such determination not later than 5 business days after making 
such determination, by mail or, if authorized by the consumer for that purpose, by any other means available to the 
person. 
(iii) Contents of notice. A notice under clause (ii) shall include-
(I) the reasons for the determination under clause (i); and 
(II) identification of any information required to investigate the disputed information, which may consist of a 
standardized form describing the general nature of such information. 
(G) Exclusion of credit repair organizations. This paragraph shall not apply if the notice of the dispute is 
submitted by, is prepared on behalf of the consumer by, or is submitted on a form supplied to the consumer by, a 
credit repair organization, as defined in section 403(3) [15 USCS § 1679a(3)], or an entity that would be a credit 
repair organization, but for section 403(3)(B)(i) [15 USCS 5 1679a(3)(B)(i)1. 
(b) Duties of furnishers of information upon notice of dispute. 
(1) In general. After receiving notice pursuant to section 611(a)(2) [15 USCS § 1681i(a)(2)] of a dispute with 
regard to the completeness or accuracy of any information provided by a person to a consumer reporting agency, 
the person shall 
(A) conduct an investigation with respect to the disputed information; 
(B) review all relevant information provided by the consumer reporting agency pursuant to section 611(a)(2) 
[15 USCS § 1681i(a)(2)]; 
(C) report the results of the investigation to the consumer reporting agency; 
(D) if the investigation finds that the information is incomplete or inaccurate, report those results to all other 
consumer reporting agencies to which the person furnished the information and that compile and maintain files on 
consumers on a nationwide basis; and 
(E) if an item of information disputed by a consumer is found to be inaccurate or incomplete or cannot be 
verified after any reinvestigation under paragraph (1), for purposes of reporting to a consumer reporting agency 
only, as appropriate, based on the results of the reinvestigation promptly— 
(i) modify that item of information; 
(ii) delete that item of information; or 
(iii) permanently block the reporting of that item of information. 
(2) Deadline. A person shall complete all investigations, reviews, and reports required under paragraph (1) 
regarding information provided by the person to a consumer reporting agency, before the expiration of the period 
under section 611(a)(1) [15 USCS 5 1681i(a)(l)] within which the consumer reporting agency is required to 
complete actions required by that section regarding that information. 
(c) Limitation on liability. Except as provided in section 621(c)(1)(B) [15 USCS 5 1681s(c)(l)(B)]f sections 616 and 
617 [15 USCS §§ 1681n, 1681o] do not apply to any violation of-
(1) subsection (a) of this section, including any regulations issued thereunder; 
(2) subsection (e) of this section, except that nothing in this paragraph shall limit, expand, or otherwise affect 
liability under section 616 or 617 [15 USCS 5 1681n or I68I0] , as applicable, for violations of subsection (b) of this 
section; or 
(3) subsection (e) of section 615 [15 USCS 5 1681m]. 
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(d) Limitation on enforcement. The provisions of law described in paragraphs (1) through (3) of subsection (c) (other 
than with respect to the exception described in paragraph (2) of subsection (c)) shall be enforced exclusively as 
provided under section 621 [15 USCS § 1681s] by the Federal agencies and officials and the State officials identified 
in section 621 [15 USCS § 1681s]. 
(e) Accuracy guidelines and regulations required. 
(1) Guidelines. The Federal banking agencies, the National Credit Union Administration, and the Commission shall, 
with respect to the entities that are subject to their respective enforcement authority under section 621 [15 USCS § 
1681s], and in coordination as described in paragraph (2)~ 
(A) establish and maintain guidelines for use by each person that furnishes information to a consumer reporting 
agency regarding the accuracy and integrity of the information relating to consumers that such entities furnish to 
consumer reporting agencies, and update such guidelines as often as necessary; and 
(B) prescribe regulations requiring each person that furnishes information to a consumer reporting agency to 
establish reasonable policies and procedures for implementing the guidelines established pursuant to subparagraph 
(A). 
(2) Coordination. Each agency required to prescribe regulations under paragraph (1) shall consult and coordinate 
with each other such agency so that, to the extent possible, the regulations prescribed by each such entity are 
consistent and comparable with the regulations prescribed by each other such agency. 
(3) Criteria. In developing the guidelines required by paragraph (1)(A), the agencies described in paragraph (1) 
shall--
(A) identify patterns, practices, and specific forms of activity that can compromise the accuracy and integrity of 
information furnished to consumer reporting agencies; 
(B) review the methods (including technological means) used to furnish information relating to consumers to 
consumer reporting agencies; 
(C) determine whether persons that furnish information to consumer reporting agencies maintain and enforce 
policies to assure the accuracy and integrity of information furnished to consumer reporting agencies; and 
(D) examine the policies and processes that persons that furnish information to consumer reporting agencies 
employ to conduct reinvestigations and correct inaccurate information relating to consumers that has been furnished 
to consumer reporting agencies. 
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TITLE 15. COMMERCE AND TRADE 
CHAPTER 41. CONSUMER CREDIT PROTECTION 
CREDIT REPORTING AGENCIES 
15 USCS § 1681t (2004) 
§ 168It. Relation to State laws 
(a) In general. Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c), this title f!5 USCS 55 1681 et seq.] does not annul, 
alter, affect, or exempt any person subject to the provisions of this title [15 USCS §§ 1681 et seq.] from complying 
with the laws of any State with respect to the collection, distribution, or use of any information on consumers, or for 
the prevention or mitigation of identity theft, except to the extent that those laws are inconsistent with any provision 
of this title [15 USCS §§ 1681 et seq.], and then only to the extent of the inconsistency. 
(b) General exceptions. No requirement or prohibition may be imposed under the laws of any State— 
(1) with respect to any subject matter regulated under— 
(A) subsection (c) or (e) of section 604 [15 USCS § 1681b], relating to the prescreening of consumer reports; 
(B) section 611 [15 USCS § 1681i], relating to the time by which a consumer reporting agency must take any 
action, including the provision of notification to a consumer or other person, in any procedure related to the disputed 
accuracy of information in a consumer's file, except that this subparagraph shall not apply to any State law in effect 
on the date of enactment of the Consumer Credit Reporting Reform Act of 1996 [enacted Sept. 30, 1996]; 
(C) subsections (a) and (b) of section 615 [15 USCS § 1681m], relating to the duties of a person who takes any 
adverse action with respect to a consumer; 
(D) section 615(d) [15 USCS § 1681m(d)], relating to the duties of persons who use a consumer report of a 
consumer in connection with any credit or insurance transaction that is not initiated by the consumer and that 
consists of a firm offer of credit or insurance; 
(E) section 605 [15 USCS 5 1681c], relating to information contained in consumer reports, except that this 
subparagraph shall not apply to any State law in effect on the date of enactment of the Consumer Credit Reporting 
Reform Act of 1996 [enacted Sept. 30, 1996]; 
(F) section 623 [15 USCS § 1681s-2], relating to the responsibilities of persons who furnish information to 
consumer reporting agencies, except that this paragraph shall not apply— 
(i) with respect to section 54A(a) of chapter 93 of the Massachusetts Annotated Laws (as in effect on the date 
of enactment of the Consumer Credit Reporting Reform Act of 1996 [enacted Sept. 30, 1996]); or 
(ii) with respect to section 1785.25(a) of the California Civil Code (as in effect on the date of enactment of the 
Consumer Credit Reporting Reform Act of 1996 [enacted Sept. 30, 1996]); 
(G) section 609(e) [15 USCS § 1681g(e)], relating to information available to victims under section 609(e) [15 
USCS § 1681g(e)]; 
(H) section 624 [15 USCS § 1681s-3], relating to the exchange and use of information to make a solicitation for 
marketing purposes; or 
(I) section 615(h) [15 USCS § 1681m(h)], relating to the duties of users of consumer reports to provide notice 
with respect to terms in certain credit transactions; 
(2) with respect to the exchange of information among persons affiliated by common ownership or common 
corporate control, except that this paragraph shall not apply with respect to subsection (a) or (c)(1) of section 2480e 
of title 9, Vermont Statutes Annotated (as in effect on the date of enactment of the Consumer Credit Reporting 
Reform Act of 1996 [enacted Sept. 30, 1996]); 
(3) with respect to the disclosures required to be made under subsection (c), (d), (e), or (g) of section 609 [15 
USCS § 1681g], or subsection (f) of section 609 [15 USCS § 1681g] relating to the disclosure of credit scores for 
credit granting purposes, except that this paragraph— 
(A) shall not apply with respect to sections 1785.10, 1785.16, and 1785.20.2 of the California Civil Code (as in 
effect on the date of enactment of the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003 [enacted Dec. 4, 2003]) 
and section 1785.15 through section 1785.15.2 of such Code (as in effect on such date); 
(B) shall not apply with respect to sections 5-3-106(2) and 212-14.3-104.3 of the Colorado Revised Statutes (as 
in effect on the date of enactment of the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003 [enacted Dec. 4, 2003]); 
and 
(C) shall not be construed as limiting, annulling, affecting, or superseding any provision of the laws of any State 
regulating the use in an insurance activity, or regulating disclosures concerning such use, of a credit-based insurance 
score of a consumer by any person engaged in the business of insurance; 
(4) with respect to the frequency of any disclosure under section 612(a) [15 USCS 5 1681j(a)], except that this 
paragraph shall not apply— 
(A) with respect to section 12-14.3-105(l)(d) of the Colorado Revised Statutes (as in effect on the date of 
enactment of the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003 [enacted Dec. 4, 2003]); 
(B) with respect to section 10-1-393(29)(C) of the Georgia Code (as in effect on the date of enactment of the 
Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003 [enacted Dec. 4, 2003]); 
(C) with respect to section 1316.2 of title 10 of the Maine Revised Statutes (as in effect on the date of 
enactment of the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003 [enacted Dec. 4, 2003]); 
(D) with respect to sections 14-1209(a)(l) and 14-1209(b)(l)(i) of the Commercial Law Article of the Code of 
Maryland (as in effect on the date of enactment of the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003 [enacted 
Dec. 4, 2003]); 
(E) with respect to section 59(d) and section 59(e) of chapter 93 of the General Laws of Massachusetts (as in 
effect on the date of enactment of the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003 [enacted Dec. 4, 2003]); 
(F) with respect to section 56:ll-37.10(a)(l) of the New Jersey Revised Statutes (as in effect on the date of 
enactment of the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003 [enacted Dec. 4, 2003]); or 
(G) with respect to section 2480c(a)(l) of title 9 of the Vermont Statutes Annotated (as in effect on the date of 
enactment of the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003 [enacted Dec. 4, 2003]); or 
(5) with respect to the conduct required by the specific provisions of— 
(A) section 605(g) [15 USCS 5 1681c(g)]; 
(B) section 605A [15 USCS 5 1681c-l]; 
(C) section 605B [15 USCS 5 1681c-2]; 
(D) section 609(a)(1)(A) [15 USCS S 1681g(a)fl)(A)1; 
(E) section 612(a) £15_USCS_§_1681j(a)]; 
(F) subsections (e), (f), and (g) of section 615 [15 USCS 5 1681m]; 
(G) section 621(f) [15 USCS 5 1681s(f)]; 
(H) section 623(a)(6) [15 USCS 5 1681s-2(a)(6)l; or 
(I) section 628 [15 USCS 5 1681w]. 
(c) Definition of firm offer of credit or insurance. Notwithstanding any definition of the term "firm offer of credit or 
insurance" (or any equivalent term) under the laws of any State, the definition of that term contained in section 603 
(I) [15 USCS 5 1681a(Q] shall be construed to apply in the enforcement and interpretation of the laws of any State 
governing consumer reports. 
(d) Limitations. Subsections (b) and (c) do not affect any settlement, agreement, or consent judgment between any 
State Attorney General and any consumer reporting agency in effect on the date of enactment of the Consumer 
Credit Reporting Reform Act of 1996 [enacted Sept. 30, 1996]. 
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15 USCS § 1692h 
§ 1692h. Multiple debts 
If any consumer owes multiple debts and makes any single payment to any debt collector with respect to such 
debts, such debt collector may not apply such payment to any debt which is disputed by the consumer and, where 
applicable, shall apply such payment in accordance with the consumer's directions. 
